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NOTE
THE FACIAL UNREASONABLENESS
THEORY: FILLING THE VOID BETWEEN
PER SE AND RULE OF REASON
INTRODUCTION
To curb the unchecked restraints which trusts and monopolies
imposed upon the free enterprise system, Congress enacted the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.1 Section 1 of the Act provides that
"[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, . . . is declared to be
ilegal."2 Although this section's general intent to promote free en-
terprise is clear,3 the legislative history surrounding its enactment
does not define explicitly the bounds of the statute's proscrip-
tions.4 Thus, to confine the all-encompassing language of section 1,
1 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)); see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1944); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491-93 & n.15 (1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 359 (1932). See generally 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4 (1980).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section I of the Act provides that violations shall carry criminal
sanctions and be punishable by fine. Id. Equitable relief also may be granted in appropriate
circumstances. Id. § 4; see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 31-32
(1976). See generally 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.02
[2] (1980) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI].
3 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921) (pur-
pose of the Sherman Act is to maintain free competition); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609 (1914) (Act condemns combinations and
conspiracies obstructing "the free and natural flow of trade"); United States v. Union Pac.
Ry., 226 U.S. 61, 87 (1912) (statute intended to preserve "free action of competition in inter-
state commerce"); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337 (1904) (Act
designed to forbid destruction or restriction of free competition). In enacting the statute,
"Congress' purpose was to restore, so far as possible, an economic climate in which natural
market forces could freely operate unrestricted by artificial or monopolistic restraints im-
posed by the large and powerful business organizations of the period." 1 E. KINTNER, supra
note 1, § 4.18, at 239; see 21 CONG. REc. 2558 (1890)(remarks of Sen. Pugh).
4 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 & n.10 (1940); Letwin, Congress
and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. RE V. 221, 253 (1956). Despite the
existence of extensive congressional debate, see 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-4.18, at
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the courts began to approve reasonable restraints of trade.5 When
examined under this "rule of reason," however, certain practices
consistently were found to be unlawful.6 In time, the judiciary con-
demned these restraints without engaging in the complicated and
burdensome rule of reason analysis, reasoning that such practices
were inherently anticompetitive. This "per se" characterization
eventually became unpopular, however, when the courts recognized
that certain restrictions on trade, which appeared to be familiar
prohibited conduct, actually enhanced competition."
Neither the burdensome rule of reason nor the sweeping per se
rule, therefore, has been a totally satisfactory means of dealing
with restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' This
is particularly true regarding the intricate nuances of novel com-
mercial practices."0 This Note initially will examine the develop-
ment of the rule of reason and the per se approach by focusing
upon the Supreme Court cases which have molded these analytical
theories. This will be followed by an analysis of the middle tier
standard suggested by the Fifth Circuit11 as a means to bridge the
125-242, section l's legislative history does not provide clear insight into the intended scope
of the Act. Id.
I See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-79 (1911); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); notes 51-63 and accompanying text
infra.
' See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); notes 70-77 and accompanying text infra.
I See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606-10 (1972); Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-501 (1969); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 36-47 (1960);
Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-12 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951); text accompanying notes 77, 85 & 99 infra.
I See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1979); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemp-
tions, Expanding Coverage and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265, 328
(1979); notes 133-138 & 146-151 and accompanying text infra.
I See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 8, at 328. Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 443 U.S. 36, 50-51, 57 (1977) (per se rule should not be expanded) with
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) (illustrates the Court's reluc-
tance to apply rule of reason because intricate economic analysis is required). One commen-
tator has characterized courts as being "expositors of applied microeconomic policy." Sulli-
van, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 3 (1980).
' See notes 184-190 and accompanying text infra; see, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 556-57 (1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S.
Mar. 9, 1981).
" See United States v. Realty Mutli-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1980);
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gap between these two traditional approaches. The Note will con-
clude that this intermediate "facial unreasonableness" theory
presents a logical and practical response to the problems created
by traditional section 1 Sherman Act analyses.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON
Characterized by laissez-faire economics, the latter part of the
nineteenth century12 was an era in which the federal government's
reluctance to interfere with business enabled industries to expand
at a rapid pace.1 3 The absence of governmental regulation, how-
ever, permitted strong commercial forces to engage in trade prac-
tices which weakened the competitive position of smaller enter-
prises.1 Small entrepreneurs, wishing to avoid what they perceived
to be impending financial ruin, began to combine or consolidate
their businesses with those of their competitors.15 Because this
notes 161-181 and accompanying text infra.
11 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 79-80; Sullivan, supra note 9, at 6; Note, Judi-
cial Limitation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 552, 554 & n.20
(1980); see W. BALDWIN, ANTITRUST AND THE CHANGING CORPORATION 4-5 (1961). The govern-
ment's adoption of a laissez-faire economic policy largely was responsible for the increased
standard of living enjoyed by eighteenth and early nineteenth century society. Id. at 5. The
government's philosophy of economic noninterference was fostered by Social Darwinism's
survival-of-the-fittest theory. F. DULLES, THE UNrrED STATES SINCE 1865 63-65 (1959). Eco-
nomic Darwinist principles called for unregulated competition which would allow only the
most efficient businesses to thrive, thus ridding the marketplace of wasteful and inferior
enterprises. Id. See generally W. BALDWIN, supra, at 7-21.
13 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-12; see Ohio Life & Trust Co. v. Debolt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 442-43 (1853) (Catron, J., concurring) (governmental noninterference
fostered "unparalleled increase of corporations throughout the Union within the last few
years"); C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE BEARDS' NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
288-95 (W. Beard rev. ed. 1968); 1 A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS §§ 34-35, at 30-31
(1901).
14 1 E. KINT E , supra note 1, § 3.2, at 80; see Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co.,
[1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613, aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25; 1 U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMMaISSION, PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, pt. I at 9; pt. II at 109 (1900); W. BALD-
WIN, supra note 12, at 10; C. BEARD & M. BEARD, supra note 13, at 289. A clear example of a
commercial practice which weakens the competitive position of smaller businesses is preda-
tory pricing. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 559 & n.6 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1981). Predatory pricing occurs when
an enterprise deliberately sets prices at a level below cost to eradicate "an equally or more
efficient competitor." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 188; see Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d at 559 n.6; cf. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 987 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (F.T.C. 1980) (predatory pricing requires inquiry as to the
"extent to which dominant firms may aggressively pursue competitive opportunities").
"I Sullivan, supra note 9, at 5. The struggle for continued industrial growth coupled
with the instinct for self-preservation motivated businessmen to form business pools and
trusts which would protect them from predatory trade practices, while fostering economic
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trend toward conglomeration threatened to vest a relatively small
segment of society with most of the nation's wealth,"6 Congress en-
acted the Sherman Antitrust Act. 17
Although the Act's legislative history bespeaks no specific so-
cial policy,' it is clear that the objective of the statute is to benefit
the consumer by promoting competition. 9 Indeed, Senator Sher-
man, the sponsor of the original bill,2 0 stated that "[tihe law of
selfishness uncontrolled by competition" permitted monopolists to
development. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2], at 2-17; accord, C. BEARD & M.
BEARD, supra note 13, at 288-95; see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50
(1911); see, e.g., American Preservers' Trust v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 46 F. 152, 154 (1891) (fruit
preservers trust); Gould v. Head, 38 F. 886, 888 (1889) (cattle trust); People v. Chicago Gas
Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 291-92, 22 N.E. 798, 802 (1889) (gas trust); State v. Standard Oil Co.,
49 Ohio St. 137, 185-86, 30 N.E. 279, 290 (1892) (oil trust); People v. North River Sugar Ref.
Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 586, 24 N.E. 834, 836 (1889) (sugar trust); Mallory v. Hanour Oil Works,
86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396, 897-98 (1888) (cotton-seed oil combination).
11 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 536 (1944);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945); 1 H. TOULMIN,
JR., TOULMIN's ANTITRUST LAWS §§ 4.7-4.8, at 107-12 (1949); C. BEARD & M. BEARD, supra
note 13, at 291-93. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32-48 (1911).
11 See note 1 and accompanying text supra. Notwithstanding the popularity of trusts as
a means of consolidating and managing large enterprises, a fear of plutocracy pervaded this
period of economic expansion. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2]. By eliminating
small competitors and defrauding consumers, trust proponents exposed themselves to wide-
spread public criticism. Indeed, citizens felt that trusts had used their power "to oppress
individuals and injure the public generally." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
50 (1911). Additionally, a series of economic depressions heightened the discontent of the
American public. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[3][a]. Consequently, public senti-
ment was ripe for the passage of the Sherman Act. See Letwin, supra note 4, at 225.
"8 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897). The con-
gressional debates and reports do not define the broad terms contained in the Act. R. Pos-
NRR, supra note 2, at 3. Neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor common law
reveals the specific social policy which motivated the passage of the Sherman Act. Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE
L.J. 775, 784 (1965).
" See note 3 supra. The Supreme Court stated that "[tihe purpose of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appro-
priate freedom in the public interest, [and] to afford protection from the subversive or coer-
cive influences of monopolistic endeavor." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 359 (1933). Indeed, an earlier Court injected its philosophy of competition into the
Sherman Act. Justice Peckham emphasized that "[c]ompetition, free and unrestricted, is
the general rule which governs all the ordinary business pursuits and transactions of life."
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 337 (1897); see, e.g., United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171
U.S. 505, 577 (1898).
20 Senator John Sherman, a prominent Republican from Ohio, led the movement for
antitrust legislation in Congress. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[4][a]. But see Yank-
wich, Competition, Real or Soft?, 14 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1954).
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oppress the public through the unbridled pursuit of profits.2 ' The
application of this theme to antitrust law, however, was left to ju-
dicial construction.22
The first significant judicial attempt to define the broad scope
of the Sherman Act was made by Justice Peckham in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,25 a case involving an
organization of eighteen railroad companies (the Association),
which agreed to adhere to certain rates, rules, and regulations for
the carriage of freight.24 Responding to the government's conten-
tion that this arrangement constituted an unlawful restraint of
trade,25 the defendants argued that the uniform rate structure was
necessary to avoid severe price wars which would be ruinous to
those in the industry.26 The defendants asserted that despite the
21 A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 13 (1910). Senator Sherman vigorously
condemned the trusts and their effects on the lives of consumers:
These trusts and combinations are great wrongs to the people. . . . They operate
with a double-edged sword. They increase beyond reason the cost of the neces-
saries of life and business, and they decrease the cost of the raw material, the farm
products of the country. They regulate prices at their will, depress the price of
what they buy, and increase the price of what they sell. They aggregate to them-
selves great enormous wealth by extortion, which makes the people poor. Then
making this extorted wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate
victims, the people of the United States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained by
law, their ceaseless round of peculation under the law, till they are fast producing
that condition of our people in which the great mass of them are servitors of those
which have this aggregated wealth at their command.
Id. at 14-15 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890)). See generally W. BALDWIN, supra note 12,
at 25-32.
22 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977). The broad language
of the Act was intended to appease various factions within Congress, see VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 2, § 2.02[4][b], and "has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found
to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 360 (1933). Additionally, judicial interpretation of the Act has been derived not
only from the words of the statute, but occasionally "by a resort to the history of the times
when it was passed." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318-19
(1897).
As a result of judicial construction, several standards by which to judge the lawfulness
of a restraint evolved. These gauges of legality included a "literalist" interpretation, United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897), a direct and immediate
effect test, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898), an ancillary re-
straints standard, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and the rule of reason, Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). See generally 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 340-50 (1980);
Bork, supra note 18, at 796-805.
23 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
24 Id. at 310.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 310-11.
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Act's broad language, the reasonableness standard which had pre-
vailed at common law should be deemed carried forward into the
Sherman Act.27 Thus, since the agreement did not constitute an
unreasonable restraint, it was contended that the Association did
not contravene the Act.28 Rejecting this argument, the Court held
that the statute should be applied literally so as to encompass all
contracts which restrained trade.2 9 To engraft upon the Sherman
Act a reasonableness standard, the Court stated, would improperly
add to the Act "that which has been omitted by Congress,"80 im-
pose an onerous burden upon the courts, sl and ultimately harm the
public because private plaintiffs would be discouraged by the bur-
den of establishing that a restraint lacks reasonableness.2
Justice White, joined by three other justices, vigorously dis-
2'7 Id. at 327-28. In the late nineteenth century, English courts embraced a common-law
rule of reason analysis for determining the legality of a restraint of trade. Nordenfelt v.
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, 565. The general rule was that
"restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy,
and therefore void." Id. Nevertheless, courts did not condemn automatically all restraints:
It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restric-
tion is reasonable-reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests ...of the
public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in
whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the
public.
Id.; accord, Horner v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (P.C. 1831). This common-law stan-
dard of reasonableness was adopted by pre-Sherman Act American courts. See, e.g., Gibbs
v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y.
473, 482, 13 N.E. 419, 421 (1887). As applied, the rule commanded that a contract be en-
forced if "under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular
contract involved in it, the contract . . .is not . . .unreasonable." 130 U.S. at 409. The
question of reasonableness often arose in connection with the purchase of a business or
industry. The courts indicated that a restraint would be considered reasonable if the re-
straint "imposed is no greater than is essential to the protection of the obligee in the enjoy-
ment of the business or industry or practice purchased." 2 A. EDDY, supra note 13, § 787, at
856; see, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889); Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 549 (1868);
Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stockyards Co., 49 N.J. Eq. 217, 256-57, 23 A.
287, 300-01 (1891). See generally United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
280-93 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 290, 327 (1897).
29 Id. at 328. The Trans-Missouri Court acknowledged that some contracts having a
pernicious effect on trade were recognized as valid at common law. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court believed, "[w]hen ... the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or com-
bination in restraint of trade ... the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not
limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade. Id.
30 Id.
21 Id. at 331-32. The Court recognized that it would be "exceedingly difficult" to de-
velop guidelines in determining reasonable restraints. Id. at 332.
22 Id. at 332-33.
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sented,33 urging that the court's failure to apply the common-law
standard of reasonableness would result in the destruction of
"both the freedom of contract and trade itself. '3 4 Indeed, the dis-
sent reasoned, since the plain intention of the law was to foster the
development of free trade, contracts not unreasonably restraining
commerce must fall outside the proscriptions of the Sherman
Act.35
Two years later, in United States v. Joint Traffic Associa-
tion,38 the Court considered whether the construction of the Act
enunciated in the factually similar 37 Trans-Missouri Freight case
was constitutionally infirm 38 because it rendered illegal all trade
restraints regardless of their reasonableness. The Joint Traffic As-
sociation defendants asserted that such an interpretation of the
Sherman Act would abridge the right to engage in contract, im-
plicit in the fifth amendment." A closely divided Court, speaking
again through Justice Peckham, stated that Trans-Missouri
Freight did not outlaw all contractual trade restraints.4 0 The Court
held that restraints having a legitimate purpose and only an indi-
rect restraining effect on interstate commerce are not within the
proscription of the Act.41 The Court noted, however, that the Joint
Traffic Association agreement, substantially identical to the agree-
ment struck down in Trans-Missouri Freight, had a direct an-
ticompetitive effect on interstate commerce, and thus, contravened
the Sherman Act.42
Although Joint Traffic Association apparently evinced the
Court's willingness to restrict the broad, literal interpretation of
1 The dissenting members of the Trans-Missouri Court included Justices White, Field,
Gray, and Shiras. Id. at 343.
3 Id. at 351.
35 Id.
36 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
17 Id. at 559. Attempting to distinguish Trans-Missouri, the members of the Associa-
tion asserted that the board of directors of any of the Joint Traffic companies could adopt a
resolution providing for a change of rates for that particular company. Id. at 562-63. Con-
versely, in Trans-Missouri, no such procedure was established. The Court, however, rejected
this distinction noting that the Board of Managers of the Association undoubtedly had the
power to enforce uniform rates or else the defecting company would face a "relentless war of
competition." Id. at 563.
38 Id. at 566-67.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 568.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 577. For a critical analysis of Justice Peckham's decisions in Trans-Missouri
and Joint Traffic, see W. TAFT, THE: ANTi-TRusT AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT 61-70 (1970).
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section 1," the adoption of a reasonableness standard would not
occur until 13 years later. Indeed, it was not until 1911, in Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States"4 that the common-law standard of
reasonableness was held to be implicitly preserved in the Sherman
Act.45 In this case, the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge
to the legality of the giant trust headed by Standard Oil.46 The
government alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrain
trade and to monopolize the oil industry by obtaining interests in
many business entities "engaged in purchasing, transporting, refin-
ing, shipping, and selling" petroleum products.47 The defendants,
however, argued that they had attained their dominant status in
the industry through "lawful competitive methods, guided by eco-
nomic genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, [and] by a
keen insight into commercial situations. '4 Notwithstanding that
the defense did not succeed in earlier cases,49 the defendants raised
the reasonableness of the challenged restraint, urging that by vir-
tue of their positions in the industry they were able to benefit the
public through increased production and lower prices2 °
Unlike the Trans-Missouri Freight and Joint Traffic Associa-
tion cases, Standard Oil embraced the reasonableness standard as
13 See text accompanying note 38 supra. But cf. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 8.1, at
345 & n.20 (direct effects test resulted from the Court's interpretation of the commerce
clause). Early commentators suggested that section 1 of the Sherman Act should be inter-
preted narrowly to limit the scope of combinations subject to attack. Fears of burdening the
court system with technical violations tended to discourage a literal reading of the statute.
A. WALKEa, supra note 21, at 56-57. Indeed, it was suggested that section 1 should have
been construed to prohibit only "direct and material" restraints of trade. Id. at 57.
Attempting to avoid the Supreme Court's literalist interpretation, Judge Taft adopted
the ancillary restraints test used at common law. See United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Under this test, an
agreement eliminating competition was considered lawful when it was subordinate to the
main purpose of a lawful contract and necessary to make the transaction effective. Bork,
supra note 18, at 797-98. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282.
" 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" See id. at 62.
46 The Standard Oil Company was the first and most successful trust in the formative
years of antitrust law. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2][b]. Indeed, its creation led to
the enactment of many state antitrust laws. 1 H. TOULMIN, JR., supra note 16, § 4.3, at 95.
Forty competing corporations entered the Standard Oil trust agreement. The stock of these
companies was given in exchange for trust certificates. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 8.2, at
350; see 221 U.S. at 41-43. By 1880, the trust controlled much of the oil refining industry.
See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2][b] n.48; note 14 supra.
47 221 U.S. at 41.
48 Id. at 48.
41 See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
80 221 U.S. at 48.
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a means of assessing the legality of the challenged practice.5 1 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice White, author of the dissenting opin-
ion in Trans-Missouri Freight and now Chief Justice, stated that
only those restraints which unduly inhibited interstate commerce
were intended to be prohibited by the Act.2 The Court reasoned
that the antitrust statute, drafted at a time when many new types
of commercial combinations were evolving, purposely was written
in broad language to ensure that novel restraints would not escape
sanction.53 Because the statute was not intended to apply to rea-
sonable trade restraints, however, the Court found it necessary to
enunciate a standard by which the validity of a given restraint
could be judged.54 The test contemplated by the Act, according to
the Court, was the standard of reason, the same standard which
had been applied at common law.55
Chief Justice White explained that neither Trans-Missouri
Freight nor Joint Traffic Association precluded adoption of this
"rule of reason" standard. 6 Conceding that those cases did not ex-
pressly mandate that challenged practices had to be judged by the
rule of reason, he emphasized that reasonableness was an implicit
factor in those decisions.57 Indeed, the Court stated that although
Joint Traffic Association used a "direct or indirect effects" test,
the same result would have been reached if the rule of reason were
employed. 8 Moreover, Chief Justice White noted that the rule of
reason had been applied in every previous case to determine
whether the particular practice was within the ambit of the Act.59
Although the Court agreed that only unreasonable trade re-
straints offended the Act, it concluded that the practices involved
in Standard Oil exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. 0 Chief
Justice White noted that these practices gave the Standard Oil
corporation "an enlarged and more perfect sway and control over
the trade and commerce in petroleum and its products" which re-
51 Id. at 60.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 59-60.
1' Id. at 60.
51 Id.; see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
8 221 U.S. at 64-65.
Id. at 65-66.
"Id.
" Id. at 65.
60 Se id. at 73-74.
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sulted in the destruction of potential competition."' In addition,
the Court found that the defendants' centralization and domina-
tion of the petroleum industry through novel methods of combina-
tion6 revealed an illegal purpose and intent "so certain as practi-
cally to cause the subject not to be within the domain of
reasonable contention."6 3
Notwithstanding that the rule of reason proved to be a viable
standard by which the legality of a challenged practice could be
measured,6 4 it greatly expanded the inquiry required to be under-
taken by the judiciary in antitrust cases. Analyzing a potential vio-
lation under the rule of reason approach required courts to inquire,
inter alia, into the nature and history of the restraint, and, most
importantly, into its effect on competition.6 5 The individualized in-
61 Id. at 71.
11 Id. at 75.
"3 Id. at 77.
See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180-84 (1911). In
American Tobacco, five corporations allegedly combined and conspired to restrain interstate
and foreign trade in tobacco. Id. at 142-48. In addition, it was contended that the combina-
tion's practices were designed to monopolize the industry. Following the lead of the Stan-
dard Oil case, the American Tobacco Court used the rule of reason analysis. The Court
found that the history of the combination was "replete with the doing of acts which it was
the obvious purpose of the statute to forbid." Id. at 181. Indeed, the Court was influenced
by the fact that the combination arose from a "previously existing fierce trade war." Id. at
182. The combination, the Court believed, intended to gain control of the industry by either
"driving competitors out of the business or compelling them to become parties to a combi-
nation." Id. It is submitted that, at this juncture, the rule of reason analysis was in a transi-
tional stage. Although the Court firmly had adopted the reasonableness standard, there were
no general guidelines for its application until 7 years later. See note 65 infra.
6" Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Board of Trade case
involved alleged price fixing in the commodities market. The Supreme Court, employing the
reasonableness standard, held that the practice did not violate the Act. Id. at 241. Justice
Brandeis, writing for the Court, noted that the inquiry into reasonableness involves a num-
ber of factors:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
The guidelines set forth by Justice Brandeis contained the seeds of the present stan-
dards for determining whether restraints are reasonable. Unlike the per se inquiry which
focuses upon general competitive impacts, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977); notes 152-160 and accompanying text infra, the rule of reason
contemplates an examination of the restraint in light of "all of the circumstances." Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). In subjecting a commercial
practice to such scrutiny, the courts "look to the history of the restraint itself, to the prob-
lem perceived by the [defendant] and the goal sought to be achieved, and to the actual
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quiry required under this standard resulted in judicial acceptance
of competitively beneficial practices which would not have survived
under the literalist approach of Trans-Missouri Freight."6 Con-
versely, certain categories of restraints consistently were found to
lack redeeming competitive benefits when subjected to analysis
under the rule of reason.67 Thus, rather than continuing to engage
in the judicially burdensome rule of reason inquiry,"' courts began
to categorize such restraints as per se or presumptively unreasona-
ble, obviating the necessity of an in-depth analysis.6 9
effect of the restraint." Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir.
1980).
66 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). See also
notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
67 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Is See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33
(1979); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); In re Japanese Electronic
Prods., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The Japanese Electronic case illustrates the burdens
faced by courts in antitrust litigation. In this case the National Union Electronic Corpora-
tion charged that Japanese companies were driving American television manufacturers out
of the market by selling products at "artifically depressed prices." Id. at 1071-72. This con-
spiracy allegedly involved 100 firms across the globe and was over 30 years old. Id. at 1074.
After 9 years of pretrial discovery, millions of documents were produced and the transcripts
of depositions amounted to more than 100,000 pages. Id. at 1073. In 1980 alone, over 100
briefs were filed, containing in excess of 7500 pages. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
The complexities of antitrust cases have been well documented. See generally Report to
the President of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures (January 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Report of the National Commission]. The
Supreme Court has suggested that courts are "ill-equipped and ill-situated" for the deci-
sionmaking processes involved in these cases. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
611 (1972). Indeed, the Court has recognized that it is beyond the capabilities of the judici-
ary "[t]o analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless
data that would surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judg-
ment on the relative values to society of competitive areas of the economy." Id. at 611-12;
see Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Deci-
sions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1191 (1979).
So See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The per se analysis
allows businessmen to predict which practices are categorically illegal. Thus, such activity
will be deterred before its inception. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal:
A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 694-95 (1979). The per se rule also
offers administrative time savings because the questioned conduct is not subject to an in-
depth economic and circumstantial investigation by the court. Id.; Redlich, The Burger
Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1979); see United States v. Topco As-
socs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958). Conversely, the major disadvantage of the per se approach is that any procompeti-
tive aspects of the unlawful agreement are not considered. Bauer, supra, at 695; Redlich,
supra, at 5.
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THE PER SE ANALYSIS
The first practice to be found unreasonable per se was hori-
zontal price fixing.Y° In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,71
major oil companies operating in the midwest bought large quanti-
ties of gasoline which small refiners sold at low prices on the spot
market because of a lack of storage capacity.72 Past experience in-
dicated that the presence of such "distress" gasoline had a de-
pressing effect on gasoline prices.7s The defendants attempted to
stabilize the market by purchasing the distress supplies at higher
prevailing market prices.7 4 Because this effectively placed an ar-
tificial floor on gasoline prices, the United States brought suit.7 5 In
response to the government's charge that the purchasing scheme
constituted a violation of section 1, the defendants argued that be-
cause the practice contributed to the elimination of competitive
abuses, it was not an unreasonable restraint of trade. 6 Rejecting
this attempt to find shelter under the rule of reason, the Court
stated that regardless of attempted justifications, "[u]nder the
Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per
se."
77
The scope of the per se rule was defined more precisely in
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.78 The Northern Pacific
Railroad had been granted land by the federal government to lay
tracks and develop the peripheral property.79 When the railroad
subsequently conveyed the land, it inserted "preferential routing"
7o Horizontal price fixing refers to an agreement to fix prices "between or among inde-
pendent entities which compete on the same levels of product or service distribution." 2 E.
KINTNER, supra note 1, § 10.3, at 74; e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940). While horizontal price fixing is an agreement among competitors, vertical
price fixing is an agreement between a seller and a buyer, often a manufacturer and distrib-
utor, to fix resale prices. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 6.02[21[a].
71 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
72 Id. at 179-80.
73 Id. at 171.
74 Id. at 180.
75 Id. at 220.
" Id. at 218-19.
7 Id. at 223. The Socony Court did not permit any showing of a design to eliminate
competitive abuses to justify the price-fixing agreement. Id. at 218.
78 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
79 Id. at 2-3.
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clauses into the sales contracts and leases.80 These provisions re-
quired the lessee or grantee to use the Northern Pacific when ship-
ping any goods produced on the land if the rates charged were the
same as those of competing railroads.8 1 Characterizing this practice
as a classic tying arrangement,8 2 the Court noted that since the
railroad had "sufficient economic power with respect to the tying
product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product, 8 3 analysis under the rule of reason was inappro
priate.8' Under the per se rule, the Court explained, those trade
practices having a "pernicious effect on competition and lack[ing]
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."'
Another type of restraint found to be per se unreasonable was
the horizontal division of markets.8 6 In United States v. Topco As-
sociates, Inc., 7 a cooperative association comprised of regional in-
dependent grocery chains 8 functioned as a purchasing agent for its
members, allowing them to acquire and sell high quality private
label products at prices which were competitive with those of the
80 Id. at 3.
81 Id.
82 A tying arrangement may take one of two forms. First, such an arrangement is said
to exist where the sale of one product is conditioned upon the purchase of another-the tied
product. Second, a tying arrangement will be found where a buyer agrees not to purchase
the tied product from any other supplier. Id. at 5-6; 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 10.52, at
223; VON KALINOWSKu, supra note 2, § 6.02[3][c]. Since access to the tied product is ob-
structed and freedom to choose comparable products is unduly inhibited, tying arrange-
ments are not favored. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Under the
rule of reason, however, tying arrangements have been found to be acceptable when they
serve to protect the goodwill of a business, help to nurture a developing industry, or allay
consumer discontent over separate sales of certain products. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2,
§ 6.02[3][c].
82 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
8, Id. at 8.
" Id. at 5.
88 Horizontal market restrictions are characterized by an "agreement among competi-
tors which has the effect of eliminating competition in markets where, absent the agree-
ment, '[they] might otherwise compete.'" 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 10.42, at 189 (quot-
ing United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). An unlawful division of markets is established where the
parties collaborate, operate on the same level of manufacturing or distribution, deal in the
same type of product, and eliminate competition among themselves. Id. Covenants not to
compete, however, generally are excepted from this category, VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 2,
§ 6.02[2][d] n.37.
87 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
88 Id. at 598.
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larger national chains.89 As a condition to admission, however,
members were required to agree to sell Topco products only within
those territories in which the Association granted them a license.90
Although three types of licenses, exclusive,91 nonexclusive 9 2 and co-
extensive,93 were granted, the majority of licenses issued were ex-
clusive or "de facto exclusive, '94 thus "insulat[ing] members from
competition in Topco-brand goods." 95
The government charged that the division of territories elimi-
nated intrabrand competition in Topco goods at the retail level.9"
Topco responded, however, that the territorial restrictions in-
creased interbrand competition by allowing members to compete
successfully with national retailers.9 7 Moreover, the Association
urged that "without exclusivity, a private label would not be pri-
vate."' The Supreme Court, however, held that the Topco agree-
ment was a naked restraint of trade and thus per se illegal. 9 The
Court noted that good intentions and alleged motives to increase
competition are irrelevant under the per se analysis. 100
8' Id. The Association purchased food and nonfood items and resold them to its mem-
bers under its own brand names. Id. Although Topco did not manufacture or process the
items it procured, it shipped the goods directly to the members. Id. The sales of high quality
merchandise under private labels provided the members of the Association with many com-
petitive advantages. Id. at 599 & n.3.
:0 Id. at 601.
1' The exclusive territorial license allowed a member" 'to sell all products bearing spec-
ified trademarks of the Association, to the exclusion of all other persons.'" Id.
92 The nonexclusive territorial license permitted a member to sell the Association's
products along with those also licensed to sell Topco brands in the same geographical area.
Id.
93 Coextensive territorial licenses enabled two or more members of the Association "'to
sell all products bearing specified trademarks of the Association to the exclusion of all other
persons.'" Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602. Topco's licensing system proved to operate as "de facto" exclusive regard-
less of the actual license distributed. Id. This resulted from a clause in the agreement which
provided that a membership could be terminated if the member sold its goods in an area
outside of its license. Id.
I5 !d.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605. Intrabrand competition exists between wholesale or retail distributors of a
particular manufacturer's product. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
52 n.19 (1977). Conversely, interbrand competition exists "among the manufacturers of the
same generic product. . . and is the primary concern of antitrust law." Id. Interbrand com-
petition "provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power be-
cause of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product." Id.
8' United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 604 (1972).
Id. at 608.
'0 Id. at 610.
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A fourth category of restraint that traditionally has been
deemed per se unreasonable is the group boycott or concerted re-
fusal to deal. 101 Although the Supreme Court had suggested in
early cases that such restraints are presumptively unreasonable, 1°2
it was not until relatively recently that the Court unequivocally
brought the group boycott within the per se umbrella. In Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., °10  the plaintiff operated a
small retail appliance store next to a Broadway-Hale department
store.104 It was uncontroverted that Broadway-Hale conspired with
appliance manufacturers and distributors to prevent sales to the
plaintiff.10 5 The defendant conspirators maintained, however, that
this conduct was outside the scope of the Sherman Act. 08 They
argued that the existence of numerous other appliance retailers in
the area, all of whom were unaffected by the conspiracy, compelled
the conclusion that the practice lacked the requisite anticompeti-
tive effect and concomitant public harm.107 Rejecting this attempt
to demonstrate that the practice was reasonable, the Court stated
that group boycotts have long been included in that category of
restraints to which the rule of reason has been inapplicable.108 The
Court concluded that "[the group boycott] is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is
so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy." 109
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 110 the Supreme
Court applied the per se analysis to certain vertical territorial re-
101 Group boycotts consist of "group action to coerce outside parties, whatever its pur-
pose." SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE AiERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DE-
VFLOPMENTS 17 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTs]. A refusal to deal by
one person does not amount to an illegal restraint because of the absence of concerted ac-
tion. VoN KALINOWSIU, supra note 2, § 6.02[2][c] & n.34; see ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS,
supra, at 16. Hostility towards the group boycott exists because "their only perceptible
function is to coerce parties who are not members of the group to follow a prescribed course
of action." VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 6.02[3][d].
102 See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-68 (1941); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
103 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
104 Id. at 208.
105 Id. at 209.
100 See id.
107 Id. at 209-10.
10I Id. at 212.
109 Id. at 213.
110 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn was overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
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strictions.111 In Schwinn, the defendant manufacturer sought to
limit the geographical areas within which its distributors were per-
mitted to conduct business." 2 The Court held that when a distrib-
utor has purchased merchandise, obtaining dominion and control
over the goods, any attempt by the manufacturer to limit the terri-
tory within which sales may be made" 3 or to restrict sales to cer-
tain retailers 14 is a per se violation of section 1.115 The Court, how-
ever, was not willing to extend the per se approach to the situation
where the distributor or wholesaler merely acts as a consignee or
agent of the manufacturer in soliciting sales from retailers. 6 In-
stead, the Court maintained that when the manufacturer retains
title to the goods, the imposition of territorial limitations on resale
must be examined under the rule of reason." 7
THE PER SE INQUIRY: Sylvania AND BMI
Although certain types of vertical territorial restrictions had
been excluded from per se treatment in Schwinn, this limited ap-
proach was not well received by the lower courts." 8 Indeed, the
.. Id. at 379. Vertical territorial restraints exist when a manufacturer prohibits his dis-
tributors from selling goods outside an allotted territory. ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 101, at 24; VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 6.02[3][e]. The validity of vertical market
restraints was first raised in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In
White Motor Co., the Court acknowledged that its lack of experience with this type of com-
petitive restraint prohibited it from deciding whether the restraint's impact on competition
was pernicious and thus per se illegal. Id. at 261-63.
I2 Schwinn manufactured and sold bicycles to franchised retailers through intermedi-
ate wholesalers and distributors. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 369
(1967). These distributors had the exclusive right to sell to franchised retailers within a
specified area. Id. at 371. Neither the distributors nor the wholesalers were permitted to sell
bicycles to nonfranchised retailers. Id.
The sale of Schwinn bicycles was carried out in two ways. Under the "Schwinn Plan,"
distributors were mere conduits, forwarding orders to retailers without obtaining title to or
possession of the goods. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977);
see 388 U.S. at 370. Under the second type of transaction, the distributors functioned as
wholesalers, acquiring title to the bicycles and filling retail orders on demand. 433 U.S. at
43; see 388 U.S. at 370.
11 388 U.S. at 379.
14 Id.
"' Id. The Court reasoned that to allow the manufacturer to retain title and still con-
trol the product's "destiny" would be to sanction a franchising method which is "obviously
destructive of competition." Id.
Id. at 379-80.
Id. at 380.
11 See, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Tripoli Co. v. Wells Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir.)(en
banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
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outright condemnation of vertical territorial restrictions when title
had passed to the buyer was criticized as harsh and inequitable.
Attempting to circumvent the inherent injustices fostered by
Schwinn, therefore, the courts began to rely heavily upon factual
distinctions.119 In Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.120 for example, the
Third Circuit, faced with an attempt to impose vertical territorial
restrictions upon wholesalers, refused to apply the per se rule, rea-
soning that Schwinn should be restricted to "its factual con-
text. 1 21 The Schwinn case involved restrictions on sales to non-
franchised retailers which were motivated solely by marketing and
competitive considerations.122 The Tripoli case, however, dealt
with a manufacturer's attempt to bar sales of professional products
to consumers based upon product safety concerns.123 The court
concluded, therefore, that the Tripoli restraints were "of a differ-
ent order," and thus should have been judged under the rule of
reason.
24
While some courts devised means to circumvent the con-
straints of the per se rule, 25 other courts applied the analysis de-
'19 See notes 108-114 and accompanying text supra.
120 425 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
121 425 F.2d at 932. In Tripoli, the court noted that Schwinn was not intended to estab-
lish "as a per se violation every attempt by a manufacturer to restrict the persons to whom a
wholesaler may resell any product whatsoever [where title has been left to] the manufac-
turer." Id.
122 See notes 110-117 and accompanying text supra.
123 425 F.2d at 937. Wella, a manufacturer of cosmetic products, sold these goods to
Tripoli, a wholesale distributor of professional beauty care supplies. Id. at 934. Wella termi-
nated its sales to Tripoli upon learning that it was selling goods to consumers which were
intended for use by professionals. Id. Wella claimed that its action was justified because
injuries to consumers could result from the sale of inadequately labeled professional prod-
ucts. Id. at 937.
124 Id. at 936. Applying the rule of reason, the court determined that the nature of the
product was such that the restriction upon sale was reasonable. Misuse of Wella's products
by nonprofessionals could cause serious harm, including blindness. Id. at 937. The court
concluded that whether Wella's motive was to further the public interest or to protect itself
from potential product liability, it "furnished a sufficient lawful main purpose, to which the
restriction on resale of potentially dangerous products is reasonably ancillary." Id. at 938.
Because some courts followed Schwinn, while others relied upon tenuous factual dis-
tinctions, judicial applications of the per se rule in the context of territorial restrictions
appeared inconsistent. Compare E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Man-
ual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) with
Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109
(1975) and Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 640 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973).
125 In Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973), the court artfully dodged the application of the Schwinn rule. In
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spite a reluctance to do so.' 26 This hesitation to follow the Schwinn
decision stemmed from the realization that the mere existence of a
vertical territorial restriction, coupled with the buyer's dominion
over the goods, would require a finding of illegality even if the re-
straint clearly had been reasonable. 12 7 Judicial dissatisfaction with
the per se characterization of vertical territorial restrictions contin-
ued to mount, 128 therefore, until the Supreme Court finally over-
this case, Febco, a manufacturer, entered into an agreement naming Thompson the exclu-
sive distributor of its products in the Colorado area. 472 F.2d at 639. Consequently, Colo-
rado Pump, another distributor, was barred from purchasing goods directly from Febco and
was compelled to purchase these products from Thompson at a higher price. Id. Colorado
Pump brought suit, contending that the contract provisions were per se illegal under
Schwinn because the vertical territorial restraint restricted the sale of products after title
had passed to the distributor. Id. The court, however, distinguished Schwinn on the ground
that it involved a manufacturer who had been "'firm and resolute'" in its insistence that
there be compliance with the imposed limitations. The contract between Febco and Thomp-
son was different in character because it merely described "a primary marketing territory"
and did not forbid sales by Thompson outside the territory. Id. The court found that no
violation of the Sherman Act existed. Id. at 640-41.
126 See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1109 (1975). In Coors, a beer brewery sold and shipped beer to distributors upon whom
specific resale territorial restrictions were imposed. 497 F.2d at 1182. Upon receipt of the
beer, these distributors were obliged to ensure that retailers properly rotated and refriger-
ated the beer in accordance with the Coors requirements. Id. Coors contended that the terri-
torial restrictions were necessary to maintain the quality of the product. Id. at 1182-83.
The Tenth Circuit followed the Schwinn approach, finding Coors' territorial restrictions
on resale per se illegal. Id. at 1187. Although the court found that the brewery's relinquish-
ment of dominion over the product compelled application of the per se rule, the court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the breadth of the Schwinn approach. Id. Indeed, the court
noted that if the rule of reason had been applied, the manufacturer's territorial restrictions
could have been justified. See id. at 1187.
227 See id.; notes 115-124 and accompanying text supra.
128 Dissatisfaction with the per se approach also was visible in cases dealing with group
boycotts. In E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm. (CATM),
467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973), for example, the court
refused to apply the per se rule. 467 F.2d at 186-87. McQuade was a wholesaler of vacation
tour packages sold through retail travel agents and airlines. Id. at 180. CATM was an organ-
ization composed of representatives of air carriers which published a listing of available tour
programs. Id. McQuade brought suit alleging, inter alia, that CATM's refusal to list him on
two separate occasions was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 182-83.
The Fifth Circuit stated that an analysis of the purpose and effect of the restraint is a
prerequisite to a finding of per se illegality in the context of concerted refusals to deal. Id. at
187. Such trade practices can be characterized as naked restraints of trade only when coer-
cive or exclusionary conduct is present. Id. Because McQuade neither alleged nor proved
that CATM's actions were motivated by an intent to exclude him from the wholesale tour
market, that he was treated in discriminatory fashion, or that CATM combined with other
tour operators to deprive him of a place on the listing, the court did not feel that a naked
restraint existed. Id. at 187-88.
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ruled Schwinn in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.129
The Sylvania case represents the first clear attempt by the
Supreme Court to limit application of the per se rule. In Sylvania,
the defendant television manufacturer used restrictive franchise
agreements to limit the locations in which its products could be
sold by retailers.130 Although these agreements clearly were illegal
under Schwinn because the manufacturer tried to exercise control
over its products after title and risk of loss had passed to the
buyer, the Supreme Court refused to hold such conduct presump-
tively violative of section 1 of the Act. 31 Rejecting the Ninth Cir-
cuit's attempt to distinguish Schwinn,13 2 the Court reconsidered
the applicability of the per se standard to vertical restraints. 33
Noting at the outset that the per se rule should apply only to
"manifestly anticompetitive" conduct, the Court assessed the com-
petitive effects of nonprice vertical restrictions.' Notwithstanding
that such restrictions reduce intrabrand competition, the Court
noted that they tend to increase interbrand competition.'3 5 Thus,
because these practices do not have a "pernicious effect on compe-
tition,"'3' the Court declined to apply the per se label'37 and held
129 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
130 Id. at 38. Sylvania's franchise agreements did not purport to grant exclusive sales
territories. They did provide, however, that each franchise owner could sell Sylvania prod-
ucts only from his specific franchise location. Id. When Continental attempted to move its
Sylvania merchandise to a new, nonfranchised location with the intention of conducting a
retail business there, Sylvania terminated the franchise and filed suit. Id. at 39-40.
131 Id. at 58-59.
232 Id. at 45-47. Rejecting the trial court's imposition of per se liability, the Ninth Cir-
cuit distinguished Schwinn by focusing upon the "potential for competitive harm" created
in each case. Id. at 41.
13 Id. at 47-59. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's efforts to distinguish
Schwinn, see note 132 supra, reasoning that there appeared to be no "principled basis" for
differentiating the two cases. 433 U.S. at 46. The Court then noted that the "need for clarifi-
cation of the law in this area" persuaded it to reevaluate Schwinn. Id. at 47.
:34 433 U.S. at 50.
135 Id. at 58.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 58-59. The Court noted that Schwinn's "per se rule for sale transactions re-
flected the view that vertical restrictions are 'so obviously destructive' of intrabrand compe-
tition that their use would 'open the door to exclusivity of outlets."' Id. at 52. Conversely,
the continued application of the rule of reason to nonsale transactions "reflected the view
that [vertical restrictions] have too great a potential for the promotion of interbrand compe-
tition to justify complete prohibition." Id. at 53. Reviewing the rationale underlying the
Schwinn decision, the Sylvania Court was unable to find support for the sale-nonsale dis-
tinction. Id. at 54, 56. The Court concluded that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between
sale and nonsale transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of the per se rule in
one situation and the rule of reason in another. Id. at 57.
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that the rule of reason is the proper standard by which the legality
of vertical restraints is to be determined.138
The Court again reevaluated its approach to allegations of per
se illegality in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 39 (BMI), a case involving a challenge to the blanket
licensing of musical compositions.1 40 Alleging that such licenses
constituted illegal price fixing, a prohibited tying arrangement, and
a concerted refusal to deal, CBS instituted an action against the
licensing entities.1 41 Reversing the Second Circuit's condemnation
of the licensing agreement, the Supreme Court held that the al-
leged violation did not constitute a per se unreasonable restraint of
trade. " 2 At the outset, the Court noted that not every practice lit-
erally falling within a traditional per se label such as "price fixing"
merits automatic condemnation. 14  The Court reasoned that it
would be an overly broad and simplistic approach to condemn
these practices without considering whether they are "'plainly an-
ticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue.' "114 Thus,
the Court stated that the inquiry is whether the alleged restraint
"facially appears to be one that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output .. .or instead
[whether it is] designed 'to increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive.' ,,145 The Court deter-
mined that the blanket license involved in BMI met several vital
needs of the industry because it facilitated the licensing of a large
number of compositions quickly and with a minimum of adminis-
trative expense, provided a reliable method for collection and dis-
tribution of royalties, and furnished a monitoring system for the
"' Id. at 59.
's' 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
140 Under a "blanket licensing" system, certain organizations operate as clearinghouses
for the licensing of copyrighted musical compositions. Id. at 5. Copyright owners grant to
these clearinghouses, on a nonexclusive basis, the right to license their compositions for
public performance. Id. In return, the organizations perform various functions for the com-
posers, including the collection and distribution of royalites. Id. Authorizations from clear-
inghouses such as BMI almost always take the form of blanket licenses. These arrangements
permit the licensees to use any and all compositions in the library of the organization for a
fixed term. Id. Almost all television and radio broadcasters hold blanket licenses from
clearinghouse organizations which charge them a fixed rate or a percentage of total dollar
revenues. Id.
" Id. at 6.
14 Id. at 7.
113 Id. at 9.
244 Id.
145 Id. at 19-20.
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detection of unauthorized use of copyrighted materials. 46 Recog-
nizing that the blanket licensing arrangement offered the impor-
tant advantage of cost efficiency over individually negotiated
agreements, the Court did not view it as a mere aggregation of sep-
arate licenses. 147 Rather, the Court posited that the blanket license
was a product unto itself.148 Thus, the Court reasoned that "a sim-
ple horizontal arrangement among competitors" did not exist not-
withstanding that the price for the product was not determined by
the competitive activity of the individual copyright owners. 4 9 The
Court concluded that it was apparent that the blanket license was
not being used by persons in a competitive relationship to conceal
price fixing.1 0 Having found that the blanket license was not a
"naked restraint of trade" without redeeming competitive benefits,
the Court declined to apply the per se rule, remanding instead for
analysis under the rule of reason.' 5 '
The thrust of the per se rule is to allow the courts "to make
broad generalizations about the social utility of particular commer-
cial practices."' 5 2 The BMI and Sylvania decisions indicate that
while such judgments may sweep broadly, they must not be ap-
plied blindly. Indeed, these cases prohibit courts from routinely af-
fixing the per se label to a practice merely because it can be char-
acterized as a territorial restriction,'"3 horizontal price-fixing
I" Id. at 20.
147 Id. at 21-22.
14I Id.
149 Id. at 23.
:IO Id. at 23-24.
151 Id. at 20, 24-25. The Supreme Court did not consider the blanket license a naked
restraint of trade because it felt that the practice was an "acceptable mechanism" for the
dissemination of copyrighted musical compositions. Id. at 24. Justice Stevens dissented,
agreeing that the case should be decided under the rule of reason, but asserting that the
blanket licenses should have been found unlawful under that standard. Id. at 25-26 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). He reasoned that the licensing system was "patently discriminatory"
because prices were based upon a percentage of the advertising revenues of the buyer rather
than on the quantity or quality of the music used. Id. at 30-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One
commentator has noted that Justice Stevens was applying a truncated rule of reason analy-
sis which compares the pricing policies of the questioned practice to a perfectly competitive
market and demands a satisfactory explanation from the defendant if he wishes to escape
liability. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 8, at 334.
' ' Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
153 See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978). In Eastern Scientific, the plaintiff contended
that its supplier refused to permit sales of its products outside of Rhode Island at less than
the retail price. 572 F.2d at 884. The district court found that this was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act, id.; see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1966),
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agreement,"" group boycott,155 or tying arrangement. 156 Rather, to
but a few days after this decision, the Supreme Court issued its Sylvania opinion. 572 F.2d
at 884. On appeal, therefore, the First Circuit felt bound by the Supreme Court's mandate
that "departure[s] from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable eco-
nomic effect rather than. . . formalistic line drawing." Id. at 885 (quoting Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977)). Eastern contended that although the rule
could no longer be applied to mere territorial restrictions, resale price restrictions were still
per se illegal. 572 F.2d at 885. The First Circuit reasoned, however, that under Sylvania, the
pro and anticompetitive effects of a given restraint had to be balanced. Id. The court noted
that resale price restrictions could not "have a greater anti-competitive effect than a pure
policy of territorial restrictions." Id. Thus, the court concluded, since pure territorial restric-
tions are analyzed under the rule of reason, there was "no reason. . . why a similar but less
anti-competitive scheme should be treated differently." Id. at 886.
154. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 557 & n.4 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1981); notes 184-187 and accompanying
text infra.
' 5 See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579
F.2d 484, 490 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Hatley v. American
Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 195, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Bauer, Per
Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 685, 694-95 (1979). See also Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d
165, 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). Group boycotts have been condemned
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 347
(1963); Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). Recognizing the
impracticality of that rule and the procompetitive effects of certain concerted refusals to
deal, the lower courts have applied the per se rule only to those boycotts which are "clearly
exclusionary or coercive in nature." Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 462 F. Supp. 685, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1978); see Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (9th Cir.
1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179-80, 1179 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). These
courts have circumvented the rigidity of the per se rule by reasoning that the need for its
application "depends not upon a finding that [a restraint] constitutes a 'boycott' but upon
an analysis of its purpose and competitive impact." Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 462 F.
Supp. at 691. In Gould, a patentholder alleged that members of the laser industry conspired
to violate the Sherman Act by agreeing to deal with him only under the licensing terms set
by the group. Id. at 688. The court believed that such an agreement did not warrant per se
treatment. Id. at 691. Although such concerted activity "was unquestionably coercive," the
coercion, according to the court, "was not directed at a competitor, and the participants in
the boycott were not seeking to increase their market shares at the expense of competing
firms." Id. Thus, the restraint was found not to be so "manifestly harmful to competition"
as to forego a rule of reason inquiry into the defendants' justifications for the restraint. Id.
'6" See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., [1979] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 62,806 (C.D. Cal.). The Supreme Court has enunciated a rule of per se illegality concerning
tying arrangements. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); notes
78-85 and accompanying text supra. Such agreements will be found to violate the Sherman
Act if four elements are found to exist. There must be: (1) two separate, distinct products,
with the sale of one, the tied product, conditioned upon the sale of the other, the tying
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avoid "an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law,"15 the
Supreme Court has mandated that application of the per se rule be
justified by "demonstrable economic effect."' 58 The lower courts,
therefore, must balance the probability and severity of anticompe-
titive consequences with the procompetitive effects of a practice,
regardless of the label traditionally attached to the restraint. 59
The per se rule will be applied only when this balancing test man-
dates the conclusion that the challenged product almost always
will restrict competition.10
It appears, therefore, that under present law, the per se rule
can be applied only after scrutiny of the competitive effects of a
particular restraint in a given industry. This limited scrutiny can
be distinguished from the rule of reason analysis in several major
respects. The rule of reason approach entails an examination of the
precise facts in the case involved. Indeed, while the competitive
consequences of a restraint are scrutinized under both inquiries, it
is the rule of reason which looks, inter alia, to the relevant product
and geographic markets as they existed before and after the chal-
lenged practice evolved. Conversely, the per se inquiry seeks only
to make broad generalizations, and therefore, does not concern it-
self with particularities. Moreover, under the per se inquiry, the
purposes of a restraint generally are not scrutinized, except when
they tend to show competitive effects. A court engaged in the rule
of reason analysis, however, will focus upon the particular defen-
product, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953); (2) a
refusal by the seller of the tied product to sell the tying product as a distinct item of sale,
see id.; (3) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain appreciably
competition in the tied product market, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969); and (4) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate com-
merce in the tied product affected by the arrangement, id.
117 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
1I8 Id. at 58-59.
15 Id. at 50 n.16.
180 In BMI, the Supreme Court recognized the burden posed by the in-depth analysis
required under the rule of reason and cautioned that the limited per se inquiry should not
become as detailed. The Court noted:
The scrutiny occasionally required must not merely subsume the burdensome
analysis required under the rule of reason. . . or else we should apply the rule of
reason from the start. That is why the per se rule is not employed until after
considerable experience with the type of challenged restraint.
441 U.S. at 19 n.33 (citation omitted). Under the per se inquiry, therefore, competitive ef-
fects are weighed only to the limited extent necessary to decide the controversy at hand.
Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 8, at 332-33. It has been noted that this less structured ap-
proach considers "judicial economy and accuracy of result as more important than main-
taining the per se rule and the rule of reason as distinct categories of analysis." Id. at 334.
19811
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dant's purposes for developing a commercial practice and will ex-
amine the justifications for and scope of that restraint in detail.
Finally, the market power of an antitrust defendant may be con-
sidered irrelevant under the per se approach, depending upon the
type of restraint involved. Under the rule of reason analysis, this
factor is highly significant.
FACIAL UNREASONABLENESS: AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Recently, in United States v. Realty Mutli-List, Inc.,'
(RML), the Fifth Circuit devised a level of analysis which contains
the less burdensome elements of the rule of reason inquiry, seems
less harsh than the per se rule, and represents an intermediate ap-
proach to alleged Sherman Act violations. In RML, real estate bro-
kers formed an organization (RML) through which they would
pool their listings of property.16 2 Members were required to ensure
that nonmembers would not gain access to the listings and other
services provided by RML.16 3 Moreover, members were not permit-
ted to answer nonmembers' inquiries concerning listed property.1
A broker could become a member of RML only if he maintained
an active office within the county open during "customary business
hours," and had a "favorable credit report and business reputa-
tion."'65 The government brought suit, alleging that these require-
ments for admission to the organization authorized RML "to es-
tablish a group boycott of those real estate brokers who fail[ed] to
qualify under them."1 6 After the district court granted RML's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the government appealed.1 67
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis of the case by discussing
the nature of the per se rule and the guidelines for its application.
Although the RML membership criteria created a group boycott,
the court noted that the mere labeling of a restraint is insufficient
to invoke the per se rule. 6 ' Because the per se rule is limited to
"' 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
1 Id. at 1355.
"' Id. at 1357.
Id. All inquires concerning listed property had to be referred to the listing broker.
Id.
185 Id. at 1358. Prospective members also were required to receive the votes of a major-
ity of RML's active members, and to purchase one share of stock in the organization at the
current value of $1000 per share. Id.
188 Id. at 1354.
187 Id. at 1359.
188 Id. at 1365. The court noted that per se treatment is not to be extended "to a type
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those cases which fall within its rationale, 169 the court noted that it
would not be applicable if the practice "is at least potentially rea-
sonably ancillary to joint, efficiency-creating economic activi-
ties. ' 17 0 The court reasoned that under Sylvania and BMI the per
se ban should apply only if there is no uncertainty as to the an-
ticompetitive effects of a restraint of trade. Since the group boy-
cott in RML created the potential for economic efficiency, the
court concluded that per se treatment was inappropriate. 172
After making this determination, however, the court departed
from the path etched out by prior judicial decisions. Instead of
proceeding directly to the comprehensive economic rule of reason
analysis, the court scrutinized the membership criteria under a
"facial unreasonableness" theory, 17  and found them illegal be-
cause they were not "narrowly tailored" to meet RML's legitimate
competitive needs.17 4 Premising its use of this truncated analysis
upon the "flexibility" that the rule of reason provides to the Sher-
man Act,17 5 the court set forth standards by which the facial legal-
of restraint literally falling within per se category where the rationale of the generalization
is not applicable." Id.; cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 8 (1979) ("easy labels do not always supply ready answers").
1ll 629 F.2d at 1363. The RML court drew upon the previous group boycott analysis it
had espoused in E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467
F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); see note 128 supra. Under
McQuade, the court noted, the per se rule applies only when a group boycott is exclusionary
or coercive in nature. 629 F.2d at 1366.
170 629 F.2d at 1367.
171 Id. at 1365.
172 Id. at 1367. The court acknowledged that "'[t]here is good in the multiple listing
system,'" id. (quoting Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 218, 219 A.2d 635, 644
(Ch. Div. 1966)), and thus declined to apply the per se rule. 629 F.2d at 1367. In reaching
this conclusion, the court evaluated "the justifications for the particular restraints imposed
and their competitive significance" rather than merely relying upon the inflexible approach
offered by the traditional per se analysis. Id. at 1369.
173 629 F.2d at 1369. Ordinarily, after the limited inquiry reveals no per se violation of
section 1, a court analyzes the restraint fully under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979). The RML court,
however, departed from this traditional approach and scrutinized the membership criteria
under the facial unreasonableness theory. See 629 F.2d at 1369-87.
174 629 F.2d at 1381.
175 Id. at 1370. The flexibility afforded courts in adjudicating section 1 antitrust viola-
tions appears largely due to the fluid guidelines which govern the rule of reason inquiry. In
applying the rule of reason, courts are required "to void any restraint whose anticompetitive
effects outweigh its contributions to competition." Id. Although case law has revealed a
number of factors to be considered, see, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); note 65 supra, a mandate of this nature seems to allow the judici-
ary to select and apply criteria which will enable it to execute their balancing task
effectively.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ity of a practice could be judged. As an initial matter, the court
noted that any "significantly restrictive" restraint created by a
"significant market power" is subject to facial invalidation. 176 To
determine whether such a practice is indeed illegal, the court
stated that the inquiry must focus upon the competitive justifica-
tions advanced by the proponents of the restraint. Thus, a court
must decide whether the restriction is justified by "legitimate com-
petitive needs,"'1 7 and if so, whether it is "reasonably necessary"
and "narrowly tailored" to meet those ends.1 7 8 If these criteria are
not met, the court reasoned, no justification exists for the restraint,
and the potential for competitive harm permits a finding of facial
unreasonableness. 79  Significantly, the court emphasized that
under this truncated analysis, the proof of a restraint's past effects
is irrelevant because the power to create anticompetitive harm is
sufficient to condemn the trade practice' 80 The court noted, how-
ever, that if a restraint survived the facial inquiry, a court then
would be required to examine "actual effects in the marketplace"
under the rule of reason."8
It is submitted that the RML court's facial unreasonableness
test is a necessary accomodation between the per se approach and
the rule of reason. Because a finding of facial unreasonableness will
occur only after a consideration of the precise facts involved in a
case, it is submitted that this analysis is more equitable than the
sweeping per se rule. In addition, the facial scrutiny of a restraint
focuses upon the justifications for a trade practice while the per se
inquiry looks only to competitive effects. As the RML court noted,
the facial unreasonableness test is a version of the rule of reason in
17' 629 F.2d at 1372. The court found that RML possessed sufficient market power
since it was the sole multiple listing service within the county and its members "'consti-
tute(d] a vast majority'" of the active real estate brokers within the county. Id. at 1374.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1375.
179 Id.
"So Id. The RML court stated that if the justifications advanced in support of a chal-
lenged practice do not withstand scrutiny under the facial unreasonableness test, and the
defendant has the power to produce anticompetitive harm, the restraint "may be con-
demned on its face without proof of past effect." Id. Indeed, the court reasoned, "it is the
power to bring about the unjustified anticompetitive effect which the Sherman Act con-
demns." Id. at 1376. Thus, the facial unreasonableness test differs from the limited per se
inquiry in that the past effects of a general trade practice are immaterial. Id. See also
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1979); notes
152-160 and accompanying text supra.
"' 629 F.2d at 1376 n.51.
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that it requires consideration of the market power of a defendant
and the specific scope of and purposes for a restraint. This analysis
is not as burdensome as the full-scale rule of reason, however, since
it does not mandate scrutiny of the specific competitive impacts
caused by the trade practice in issue.
It is suggested that the RML court's facial analysis will be par-
ticularly useful in the context of novel restraints. Indeed, while the
per se inquiry avoids the harsh strictures of categorization, the
courts have been reluctant to find novel restraints illegal under
this approach and generally require scrutiny under the rule of rea-
son. Courts can make a decision with respect to the per se ban only
after they have looked to the evidence of harm and procompetitive
effects presented by a restraint.182 It only will be after considerable
experience with a trade practice that a court will feel competent to
make the "broad generalization" that the restraint has no "re-
deeming virtue. '18 3 It is submitted that without an intermediate
level of analysis, this experience can be gained only by looking to
the precise facts in given cases and evaluating them under the rule
of reason.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society'1 4 illustrates the courts' inclination to subject
novel restraints to a rule of reason analysis rather than the per se
inquiry set forth in Sylvania and BMI. In Maricopa, the court re-
fused to apply the per se ban against two medical care foundations
which set maximum fees that physicians could charge holders of
foundation-approved insurance policies. 85 Before rejecting the per
se rule, however, the court did not engage in the inquiry character-
ized by the balancing test set forth in BMI. Rather, the court rea-
182 See notes 158-160 and accompanying text supra.
183 Many courts have been reluctant to brand a restraint as per se illegal in the absence
of evidence that it consistently produced anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33 (1979) ("per se rule is not employed until after considera-
ble experience with the type of challenged restraint").
184 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1981).
185 643 F.2d at 554-55. In Maricopa, the State of Arizona brought suit against two foun-
dations for medical care which it had licensed as insurance administrators. Id. at 554. The
foundations periodically polled member physicians to set maximum fees which doctors
could charge patients under insurance policies approved by the organization. Id. at 554-55.
The state alleged that this "price fixing" raised the fees of members above the average
amounts charged by doctors in Arizona. Id. at 555. The state contended that this practice
was "without redeeming virtue" and should be condemned as "unreasonable per se." Id. at
556.
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soned that because it was unfamiliar with the impact of this re-
straint and "uncertain about the competitive order that should
exist within the health care industry," an in-depth rule of reason
analysis was required. 186 Indeed, the court stated that it was "im-
possible" to weigh "the pro- and anticompetitive aspects" of the
restraint in this case to determine whether the per se rule should
apply.187
It is suggested, therefore, that when novel restraints are chal-
lenged, the difficulty of balancing unknown competitive impacts
will cause courts to eschew the per se rule and lead them to turn to
the rule of reason analysis. Despite the equitable results achieved
through application of the rule of reason, however, it seems that
courts will not be able to delve into this "incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation" every time a novel or un-
classified restraint is challenged. 188 Indeed, this is true not only be-
cause of crowded court calendars and prohibitive litigation ex-
penses, 8 9 but also because inherent difficulties arise when a court
assumes the role of economic adjudicator. The judiciary often is ill-
equipped to deal with the complex economic determinations which
the rule of reason demands. 190
188 Id. The Maricopa court noted that the flaw in Arizona's argument was that it
demonstrated "nothing about the actual competitive effects of the challenged arrangement."
Id. Moreover, the court stated, no authorities, "primary or secondary, afford assurance con-
cerning its competitive impact." Id. The court, therefore, was unwilling to conclude that the
practice constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act, by looking to a mere "unsup-
ported belief" that competitive harms would result. Id. at 557.
187 Id. at 558.
188 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); note 168 and accompa-
nying text supra.
18 Due to the length and complexity of some antitrust cases, courts frequently face
significant time and caseload problems. See note 68 supra. Moreover, it has been noted that
the broad scope of the antitrust laws, liberal discovery rules, and the opportunity to obtain
large judgments may encourage parties to "view litigation as all-out economic war." Report
of National Commission, supra note 68, at 12.
,91 The complexity of rule of reason analysis is fostered by the intricate workings of
various industries. Report of the National Commission, supra note 68, at 11. Many inquir-
ies involved in determining the reasonableness of a restraint are particularly difficult and
time consuming. Judges, for example, must identify the relevant market and the percentage
of that market affected by the restraint-considerations of paramount importance which
often are difficult to measure. See Comment, Perceptible Competitive Impact-It's the
Next Best Thing to Selling There: Jim Walter Corp. v. FTC, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 312, 321
& n.49 (1981). See generally VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, at § 6.02[4][a]. Moreover, most
judges would rather not assume the task of regulating the economy because this involves the
evaluation of complex, often inconclusive criteria. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 7; see United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972). Indeed, judges and lawyers
are more comfortable with conspiracy analysis than price theory. R. POSNER, supra note 2,
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It is submitted that the RML court's facial unreasonableness
test is particularly appropriate in the context of novel restraints,
where increased economic sophistication in the marketplace and
the judiciary's lack of familiarity with competitive conditions
demonstrate the need for an intermediate level of analysis. Indeed,
under the per se inquiry, not only is the proponent of a novel re-
straint barred from asserting justifications for the challenged prac-
tice,191 but the heavy emphasis on past competitive effects 92
makes this approach totally impracticable. 193 Without an interme-
diate level of scrutiny, the courts will be obliged to examine new
restraints under the burdensome rule of reason'94 until they feel
confident enough to make a "broad generalization" about the prac-
tice. 95 It is suggested that the RML test provides a rational solu-
tion to this dilemma because it permits courts to consider signifi-
cant and more measurable factors such as motivation and market
power, gives defendants an opportunity to advance justifications
for their trade practices, and provides all concerned with an expe-
dient means to avoid protracted litigation.
CONCLUSION
Although a full-scale analysis will be avoided when a restraint
is condemned as facially unreasonable, a court must proceed fur-
ther to the rule of reason examination if the questioned practice is
upheld under the intermediate approach. Thus, if a defendant sur-
vives the per se inquiry, he must demonstrate that the restraint is
facially reasonable and, if he succeeds, must further assert that the
practice is reasonable in all respects. At first glance, therefore, it
at 41. One commentator has noted:
So long as antitrust is implemented as law there are . . . limits to the utility of
economics in its elaboration. These are due to the deficiencies of both institutions,
that of economics and that of law; economics does not comprehend enough and
law, without extreme transformations in its own structure, cannot adequately deal
with all that economics does comprehend.
SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 10.
191 E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.16 (1977). The
RML court noted that "[t]he per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an anti-
trust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score." 629 F.2d at 1362-63.
1'2 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
M9 See notes 186-187 and accompanying text supra.
g' See notes 189-190 and accompanying text supra.
195 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
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seems that facial evaluation will serve merely as an obstacle to
final adjudication. It is submitted, however, that although a re-
straint could be subjected to three levels of analysis, both the per
se and facial unreasonableness inquiries entail the examination of
those factors which otherwise would be examined under the rule of
reason. Thus, it is suggested that RML's new analysis is a screen-
ing process which permits only truly ambiguous restraints to be
scrutinized in detail under the rule of reason. Indeed, a court
should not be required to engage in complex economic analysis un-
less the commercial practice is proven facially reasonable and,
therefore, worthy of continued investigation under the full-scale
rule of reason analysis.
Additionally, since proof of past competitive effects is irrele-
vant under the facial unreasonable analysis, it might be argued
that a court will never gain sufficient experience with novel re-
straints to make future "broad generalizations" that plainly an-
ticompetitive effects always result from such practices. Notably,
however, the RML court stated that when a practice has no com-
petitive justification or is too broad to serve legitimate needs, the
restraint has "anticompetitive effect[s] which [have] no counter-
vailing procompetitive benefit. ' 196 It appears, therefore, that when
a novel practice repeatedly fails to survive facial scrutiny under the
RML test, courts will be able to make the broad generalization that
it is per se illegal.
Daniel F. De Vita
196 629 F.2d at 1375.
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